FOREWORD
The need for improved security of computer systems has risen along with the need for improved utilization of those systems. The It is anticipated that appropriate measures will be evaluated and selected only after a detailed assessment of the potential losses which these measures are to prevent (see Reed in the Bibliography). The cost justification for any measure or combination of measures must be that the problems which the measures obviate would result in a cost significantly more than that of the corresponding security measures, or that the net "cost efficiency" of the resulting system (in terms of reliability, manageability, predictability and so forth) clearly justifies the cost of security enhancements.
An array of security measures is detailed in the following sections. The intent is to familiarize readers with the protective measures that should be considered for inclusion in systems, how these features integrate into a coherent, consistent mechanism, why they are needed, and how they might be used. The following summarizes management objectives for a ' secure ADP system, classes of protective measures for achieving these objectives, and other concepts related to the system integrity and operational reliability of a secure system. 
Management Objectives
To protect data assets adequately from accidental or unauthorized intentional disclosure, modification and destruction, installation management should select security measures that will accomplish the following: In general, the principle of "least privilege" should govern. The less a person using the system is allowed to do (consistent with the work he is required to do), the safer will be the system's other users, and the individual's own processes and resources.
Named Elements
The authorization mechanism should generally operate upon names of elements and should be invoked when one named element refers to another (e.g., an access request, a call for execution, a system service request).
The mechanism should be invoked at the point where the controlling process resolves such symbolic references. For example, it should be installation management's, not the designer's, decision that "create" authority includes "alter" authority for a data object. The authorization mechanism should not force such hierarchies of authority upon management.
Levels of Authority
Installation management should be able to specify that certain authorities held by a user imply his ability to bestow given authorities upon other users.
For example, a person's authority to alter a data object should only imply at installation management option that he can authorize others to interact in any way with that object.
In general, the three authority levels:
(1) ability to interact (2) ability to authorize interactions (3) ability to appoint those who may authorize interactions should be discrete, independent conditions. None should, except at installation option, imply either of the others. This is analogous to the distinctly different authorities involved in entering a bank vault, guarding the vault (deciding who may enter), and appointing guards.
The Authorization Data
The authorization mechanism is driven by a structure of authorization data or "rules." This is, in a sense, a model of the activities that management expects and considers desirable within the system.
It is important that the authorization data be correct and adequately secure, because it actually controls system activity and has great potential for disruption.
It should be very simple for management to establish, modify, delete and display the authorization data.
If these processes are complex or difficult or unwieldy, errors will be more lil<ely, disruptions may be more frequent, and use of the authorization mechanism by installations will be less likely.
In the past, simple and flexible entry, modification and display capabilities have been perceived by installations to enhance the manageability of the system (quite apart from any security enhancement, if good management and security are indeed separable).
Where they have not been offered, management has been reluctant to use the authorization mechanism.
The authorization mechanism, to the extent feasible, should be self-protective.
Erroneous, anomalous, or inconsistent authorization data entries should be detected and reported as early as possible, hopefully at the time of entry and at least at the time they are first used in normal authorization checking.
Keeping Authorization Data Current
In all likelihood, the authorization relationships within a given system will change frequently as people, data, software and hardv^are change with time. The burden of keeping authorization data in line with current needs could easily grow out of hand (as can the amount of authorization data) if flexible entry, updating, and display capabilities are not provided.
Since there may be significant effort involved in keeping the authorization data current and correct, management must be able to delegate this work as much as possible to administrators and to users themselves in the normal installation. Another important reason for delegating authorization responsibilities is that supported departments, those whom the applications and data are serving, must be able to control access to their own resources. However, the capability of concentrating or centralizing this work is a requirement in certain environments.
Modifying Authorization Data
The authorization mechanism should ensure that management is protected against destructive or disruptive secondary effects of modifications to authorization data. When an individual with authority to access an object and to authorize others to access the object (who, in turn, may authorize still others to access the object) is about to have his authority removed, the consequences must be well understood.
One consequence (depending upon design) might be that all users whose authority originates from that individual will lose their authority when his is removed.
This may be acceptable in some cases, and it may be catastrophic in others. On the other hand, if the authorities originating from his authority are undisturbed (or untraceable) when his is removed, this too can be catastrophic, or at least create an administrative burden. The authorization mechanism should enable installation management to discern the ultimate effects of such removals or modifications of authority. This requires that the authorization data, including backchained or derivative authorities and all grouping relationships, be displayable in some wel 1-formatted structure.
Authorization Bypass Capability
Since damage to the authorization mechanism or data can disable operations, some bypass mechanism or procedure must be available so that management has the option to continue operations in an unprotected mode. Authorization mechanism design should not assume that management uniformly believes that system shutdown is preferable to interrupted or degraded protection.
On the other hand, any bypass mechanism is sensitive and dangerous and must be shown to be safe from unauthorized use.
2.9
Transfer to a Back-Up System An authorization mechanism can further complicate difficult system back-up and recovery problems.
If all, or a significant part, of the system's operations must be brought up on another hardware configuration, perhaps one that must share its capacity with another conceivably "hostile" workload, then the authorization structure should be such that the move to the new system is not inordinately difficult, requiring wholesale revision or piecemeal deletion of integrated authorization data.
If severe back-up/recovery difficulties are introduced as a result of the authorization mechanism, then a reluctance to employ the authorization mechanism at all will inevitably evolve --and properly so, since back-up is such an important installation requirement. Mechanisms have been proposed to aid this process. One such mechanism is to include in the authorization mechanism a capability such that initially, while all checking based on the growing body of authorization data is done normally, no authorization "failures" cause denial of the requested interaction.
Instead, the interaction is allowed to proceed and a record of the authorization failure is kept for subsequent analysis.
In this way, management can correct the expected high incidence of errors during the transition without disrupting normal operations. As confidence in the authorization data increases over time, the normal authorization failure processing can be used increasingly until the system has been fully converted. 
SURVEILLANCE
The objective of the surveillance mechanism is to ensure that management can detect and react appropriately to activities that it has determined may constitute security threats. The surveillance mechanism must provide a means of achieving strict personal accountability of users for their actions on the system.
In addition to such accountability processing, the surveillance mechanism may protect in real-time against damage from certain events. The event journal itself is a major security asset. At times it is the most important one. It must be protected from all but authorized access and, to the extent possible, from destructive conditions such as power failure to a volatile store.
It should be demonstrable that the journal and the journallinq process are reasonably secure and cannot be subverted easily, at least without detection.
It should be noted that, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, computer output is admissible in both civil and criminal proceedings if it is determined to be: 0 a regularly kept timely record 0 of regularly conducted business activity 0 whose preparation has been deemed "trustworthy" by the court 6 The first two conditions are relatively easy to establish for a well-run enterprise; the third may present a problem if it cannot be shown that the records and the recordkeeping process itself are reasonably safe from accidental and unauthorized intentional interference. This showing is not only essential to the court's determination of admissibility, but it is also an important defense against attacks upon the credibility of the output.
Management Inspection
The journal post-processing function (management inspection) should offer both interactive query and report generation functions.
It should be possible for management to specify that certain reports be automatically generated periodically.
If management does not have this processing flexibility and power, the likelihood is that the journal will not be inspected i regularly; users will come to know this and the deterrent value will be lost. The identification mechanism should be such that even in distributed intelligence configurations, where more than one identification process exists, the collective effect is that management can reconstruct the individual user associated with a journalled activity or event.
Unique identification is also fundamental to the integrity of operations. An estimated 70 percent of data processing-related losses occurring today can be prevented if personal , accountability and "least privilege" authorization mechanisms are installed. Identification occurs when the user provides his identity, the "name" by which he is known j to the system. The user's "name" is unique to him and unlikely to change. This identification will be used during subsequent authorization and surveillance processing.
Verification occurs when the individual, having provided an identifier, "proves" to the I system, by passing some further test of identity, that he is, in fact, the person associated !^with that identifier. Where the job entry site is a "mail drop," or courier pickup/delivery station, the drop should be physically protected or the procedure changed to a more secure one.
Protection of Identification Mechanism
System design must take into account the need to protect the identification mechanism itself. To the extent economically feasible, the tables, profiles, other data and software routines associated with the identification mechanism should be protected against unauthorized access or undetected tampering. This would enable the system to determine that the proper person is still present at the terminal after some specified period of line inactivity (for example, prior to accepting terminal input after a prolonged apparent "think time" delay, or prior to transmitting output to the terminal after lengthy transaction processing).
If the proper verifier is not entered upon demand, the process should be gracefully suspended.
Device Identification
Device identification enables detection of and recovery from switched-network line problems, some limited defense against intruding alien devices, control over certain interactions (a form of authorization), and enhanced surveillance activity.
Device identification can be accomplished in several ways.
Dial-up terminals, certain controllers, and some CPUs today offer a "hard-wired" factory-set identifier that is transmitted automatically by the device upon command from an attached device. On non-switched multipoint networks, or with local attachment, adequate identification is provided by the address at which a device is polled or selected (although a security exposure exists where it is trivial to swap cable connections at the controller either accidentally or intentionally, but without detection).
While these methods are satisfactory for local identification of devices, they are not necessarily satisfactory for higher level authorization or surveillance functions unless each such unique identifier is mapped somehow to a system-unique name for the device. The system-unique name is operated upon by the higher level mechanisms. As an example, where a subsystem controller may itself use station IDs in communicating with its terminals, and its own ID in communicating with the central processor, and the only journal ling mechanism for the system and subsystem is in the host, and the installation needs records showing which terminals received which data, this information will not exist unless the central processor journalling mechanism somehow is informed by the subsystem controller, with each message, which terminal stimulated the message.
In most of these cases, the intelligent controller itself will likely contain an authorization and/or a surveillance mechanism sufficient for its own needs.
The information acted upon by the authorization and surveillance mechanisms, and the collective record of transmissions provided by the surveillance mechanisms should, in no case, be incomplete or ambiguous.
Many communications devices that accept dial-up connections are today equipped with "potential disconnect," or line break sensing equipment for detecting conditions such as line noise or transients.
Communications systems design should include support for this equipment, such that when the "potential disconnect" interrupt occurs the system will verify that the expected device is still present on the line.
If the device is present, the session should continue without interruption, even with no indication to the user.
If the expected device is not presently on the line, the system should gracefully suspend the session if possible, for future resumption by the user with no loss of work already accomplished during the interrupted session.
If the potential disconnect sensing equipment is present but the terminal involved is not equipped with device ID, the reverification sequence should instead verify that the expected user is present on the line.
Note that this implies that the active communications process must retain the device and/or personal identifiers related to the active sessions for possible use as comparands during such reverification sequences.
Good operations practice, as well as hardware integrity considerations, make most desirable the individual identification of portable media such as disk packs, tape reels, cartridges, floppy disks, and so on.
This capability can be used to reduce or eliminate significant sources of lost data and processing time, such as operator mismounts, incorrect volume specification, and a number of integrity flaws that are described in the integrity section.
Software and Data Object Identification
System design must preclude unauthorized and undetected substitution of objects and of object names, and must preclude unauthorized, undetected, and untraceable replication and renaming of objects.
The possibility of accidental or intentional unauthorized substitution of one object for another with the same name is tantamount to uncontrolled modification of the original object and can be very dangerous in certain situations.
It also reflects a serious system design flaw; system design should be such that identically named objects cannot coexist in the system.
Positive, unique identification of all named software and data objects, whether system, subsystem, or application, is an important requirement.
Also, a serious flaw is the possibility of reproducing an object under a different name such that the system "loses track," cannot associate the replica with the original, and therefore cannot give the same protection to the copy as to the original.
In systems where this can occur, the only defense is a wel 1 -operated journal ling procedure, which, of course, is deterrent, not preventive.
The system must automatically provide identical protection to all copies of an object (under any name) as is provided for the original. This may be accomplished through hardware or software enforced addressability structures, object-name mapping, symbol resolution mechanisms, surveillance mechanisms, or by other means, but it is a basic integrity requirement. 
CRYPTOGRAPHY
Cryptography (crypto) is the transformation of data from a clear form into a secret form (encryption) and the reverse (decryption) using a process intended to be fully known only to the proper cooperating communicators of the data.
It is used when the medium containing or conveying the data (microwave transmissions, for example) cannot itself be protected adequately. The intent of encryption is to make intercepted data useless to the interceptor by making it too difficult or too expensive for him to derive the original clear data in time to use it for his purposes. (FIPS PUB 46, "Data Encryption Standard," contains a complete description of the algorithm).
The following paragraphs provide a brief discussion of considerations in the application of cryptography. Setting the link encryption keys and switching the encryption mechanisms on and off may be accomplished manually rather than by the system. The link encryption mechanisms however, must not encrypt line-control information unless they are physically sited outboard of the line-control logic at each end of the link. Thus, if the encryption devices are not outboard (stand-alone), there must be sufficient intelligence in the link encryption mechanism to distinguish link-control information (not to be encrypted) from message content (to be encrypted).
This implies that link encryption devices for different line disciplines must themselves be different.
Personal -Key Cryptography
Personal-key cryptography is the encryption/decryption of data using a key associated with (and manually set into the terminal's encryption mechanism by) an individual user. The user's personal key need not be transmitted within the system in any form under any condition. The personal key capability can be used in two fundamentally different applications. The first application is one in which a user's personal key is known to and used by the system for transmissions involving that person. The second major application of personal -key cryptography is the situation where only the terminal end of the session path encrypts and decrypts data, In this application, once the user's identity is established (in the clear) his personal key is loaded by the system at its end and by the user at his end, and communications henceforth during that session are encrypted under that key.
In this mode, the effect is similar to that of session encryption.
If there are intermediary devices, they need not be aware that the data they are forwarding is encrypted. Alternatively, the personal keys may be used only to protect a session key that is generated and distributed to the ends of a path for protecting j the data.
Data is encrypted/decrypted only at the terminal and at the host for that session.
If the session is between two terminals, with the host acting as an intermediary message-switching or processing device, then either both people must employ the same key or the system must n employ two personal keys and perform an intermediary decipher/encipher operation as it receives/transmits data between the two terminals.
In any event, in this application, encryption and decryption occur at both ends of the data path.
If the system has been designed to handle personal keys, installation management might either require that all sessions of a given user be conducted using his personal key, or elect to leave the encryption decision up to the individual on a per-session basis.
If the former requirement is implemented and the user does not load his key, his input will be deciphered by the host into meaningless characters. The user is thus forced to present his key in order to do his assigned task.
The Terminal End Alone Uses the Key
In this application, the system need not contain the individual's personal key or even be aware that encryption is taking place. The data entered into, manipulated within, and withdrawn from the system by the user remains encrypted while within the system. Individuals sharing access to the data must share the key.
The data can be processed only in a limited way (using text-editing-like functions such as block insertions, replacement, moving, and deletion) because encrypted values usually cannot be handled arithmetically and logically as can the same values in the clear; an encrypted "2" and an encrypted "3" do not add to an encrypted "5," for example. This is a very powerful method for maintaining the security of data within the system and despite its constraints, has been found useful.
Cryptography for File Security (FILESEC)
FILESEC is the protection of data that is not in transmission but is resident in a storage device.
The file security encryption function encrypts data which needs this protection while it is on-line, in the library, in shipment on portable media from one place to another, or even in main storage, but not in active processing.
To achieve file security, the data and the key used to encrypt that data must be encrypted and stored in some medium. The original clear data may be recovered from the medium on the original system or on another system equipped with the FILESEC function.
A convenient and secure way to preserve the identity of the key used to encrypt the data on removable media is to assign identification characters to the individual keys. The key identification can then be recorded directly and in the clear on the medium label. The key-ID/key correlation tables can be preserved in a secure manner at all locations authorized access to the protected, stored data, with each table encrypted under a locally-assigned key. Each table should contain only the keys to those files to be used at that location or facil ity.
Cryptographic Keys
The most sensitive element of the encryption process is the particular key used to encrypt a given object.
In fact, the usual measure of strength of the cryptographic process is the difficulty of deriving this key. The keys must be unavailable to any person or process other than those charged with generating, setting, invoking and maintaining them. Key handling must be reduced to an easily manageable physical security problem.
It must be possible to show that the keys are not exposed to tampering or disclosure while they are within the system, that they are subjected to exposure only outside the system and, then, only after physical force has been used to obtain them.
In this context, a terminal is outside the system.
Security of Keys
Keys must not exist within the system in clear form except when they are actually placed in one of the registers within the crypto device. These registers contain bit patterns currently in use as keys for ongoing encryption and decryption operations.
Ideally, the crypto device should be so designed that physical access to registers within it destroys their contents. Given such protection, microprobing, for example, could not succeed in disclosing any key.
Where there is a necessity for keys to exist in some form within the system, yet outside the crypto device, such as in transmission of session keys or in tables associating specific keys with keynames and with persons, devices, links, ongoing sessions and files against which those keynames are mapped, the keys themselves must be encrypted.
Software
The software processes that initiate key transmissions, maintain the tables of keys in storage, and control the functioning of the encryption devices should be shown to be secure against any improper use that negates the encryption (i.e., turns it off, fixes one key permanently in the encryption device, modifies the key tables) or yields any key in the clear. For example, the basic commands that control the functions of the encryption device (including unexpected and apparently illogical coding sequences) must not be able to modify the proper behavior of the encryption device or to yield any key in the clear anywhere other than in the encryption device itself.
The functions of the encryption device that must be protected include on/off switching, mode setting, encrypt/decrypt data commands, encrypt/ decrypt key commands and load key register commands.
Key Selection
Any system process used for random key generation (e.g., session and file security keys) must be shown to be secure against tampering or modeling that result in disclosure of or accurate prediction of its outputs.
Any device provided or procedure recommended for use by installation management in physically setting keys within the system (in encryption devices directly or in the system's key tables) must be shown to be secure against tampering and against any methods of interception that could yield the keys in the clear. Such a procedure might, for example, recommend offline generation and encryption of the keys and their insertion into the system in already-encrypted form, or their insertion in the clear during some period when installation management can dedicate the system (at least the host) to this operation alone.
In the latter case, the clear keys must immediately be enciphered and there must be certainty that no clear-key residue remains.
The Lost Key Problem
Encryption keys may become lost or unknown due to hardware malfunction, software error, or human failing in the physical key-handling procedures. When, for any reason, the key required to decrypt data is lost, the data itself cannot be decrypted and is permanently lost.
It is just as difficult for the properly authorized possessor to decrypt his data when the key is unknown as it is for the hostile cryptanalyst who never had the key in the first place.
Users must recognize that there is no recovery from the unknown key situation, and must recognize the various ways that keys may become lost or otherwise unavailable.
They must establish measures and procedures that can be used to minimize the effects of this situation (e.g., back-up data), or to reduce or eliminate the possibility of its occurrence (back-up copies of the keys).
COMSEC and FILESEC Applications
The loss of a key is of concern in some COMSEC and all FILESEC applications where it is impossible to recover from key loss or modification by resetting with new keys and repeating the operation.
In any COMSEC or FILESEC encryption application where hardware malfunction results in undetected modification of the key in storage or in the encryption device, or results in failure to load the expected key, encryption or decryption of data will proceed using an unknown key.
The possibility of recovery depends on the particular application.
In FILESEC applications, hardware malfunction resulting in failure to encrypt data is a serious security exposure but does not cause data loss. Malfunction resulting in modification of the correct key can result in data loss. When the protected data is the only existing copy, verification protocols should be used. When the only copy of the random file key is stored on the medium with the data, damage to the volume (broken tape, etc.) may cause loss of the key and the data cannot be decrypted. Management should ensure that, where the application warrants, duplicate back-up copies of the protected data are available.
Management should also ensure that the file master key is protected such that its loss is extremely unlikely or impossible.
Copies of that key should be maintained in several physically secure and geographically separated locations.
In both COMSEC and FILESEC, software errors and human failings (in designing and following procedures) can result in irretrievable data losses, generally in scenarios similar to those described above for hardware malfunctions.
Session Encryption Applications
The following summarizes the types of errors that may result from a hardware or other malfunction during session encryption applications: 0 Erroneous Generation of a Session Key -The generated session key is not the intended key.
The effect is not noticeable and does not diminish security (except the all "0"s and all "l"s keys in DES-V). Standard verification patterns and protocols may be employed, but these introduce some security weaknesses if their existence is known to the hostile cryptanalyst.
Link Encryption Applications
In link encryption applications, hardware malfunction cannot result in simultaneous erroneous modification of the pair of link keys (unless induced by human intervention, a problem addressed by the physical security measures protecting the linked devices) because the keys are set separately since there is no common system source.
i/See "Guidelines for Implementing and Using the Data Encryption Standard," soon to be published by the National Bureau of Standards.
Hardware malfunction could result in failure to "employ encryption at one end of the link, or in modification of one of the pair of link encryption keys. Both these errors should be detected at once because of the garbled data received at each end of the link.
In the one-way data transfer application, similar to session encryption described above, the data could be irretrievably lost. Also, because the transfer is not terminated, there could be a serious security exposure if the data were transmitted in the clear. Where malfunction results in failure to employ encryption at either end of the link (two-way transfer) the situation is very serious from the security point of view but data will not be lost.
It should be noted that where link-control information is encrypted/decrypted, discovery of malfunctions (except those resulting in no encryption at either end) should be immediate in every case.
Where link encryption failure results in apparently successful transmission of data but, in fact, the data is lost, the situation differs slightly from the session application.
Where link encryption is in use, the verification process may have to occur further along in the network than within the device to which the originator is immediately linked. The original and only copy of the data may have to be retained, not merely until the transmission across the first link is completed, but until the data reaches its ultimate destination; and this may take some time depending on the nature of the network and of the software application in use.
Personal-Key Applications
In personal-key applications where both the terminal and the host employ encryption, the exposures resulting from hardware malfunction and the concomitant verification requirements are as described above under session and link protection.
In personal -key applications where only the terminal encrypts/decrypts data, the data may be lost in some situations.
If a malfunction results in failure to employ encryption, input data will be in the clear. This is a serious security exposure but will not result in loss of the data (it will be discovered later to be in the clear in the system).
If malfunction results in use of the wrong key, there may be no recovery unless the originator has a copy of the data he entered (which should be a standard procedure for this application).
If the magnetic stripe card containing the personal key has been damaged, resulting in use of the wrong key, then the data in the system (some encrypted under the correct key and some under the wrong key) should be recoverable if the original correct key is known (which should be standard procedure; management should have a record) and/or the current incorrect key is still on the stripe. 6 .
SYSTEM INTEGRITY
System integrity--an essential goal toward system security--is the condition of correct and predictable functioning of the total data processing operation, including hardware/software, physical security measures and operating procedures in force at the installation. System integrity also assumes that data integrity is maintained at an installation under abnormal operating conditions (e.g., malfunctions, crashes, maintenance and servicing situations) as well as normal conditions.
Hardware integrity and operating system integrity are included in the following discussion, not as a guide to purchasing systems, but to alert the security implementor to measures that may already be present in his system. Physical security and operating procedures are not discussed in this paper.
See the bibliography for appropriate references. It is difficult to over-emphasize the importance to data security of some of the more recent developments in the management of programming staffs. The adoption of what is known as "structured programming," "top-down programming," or the "chief programmer" method not only promises enhanced productivity and fewer errors but also tends to force programmers into col lusion with others if they are to get dishonestly conceived and written code into operation.
Except for certain transaction-driven systems in which terminal users can be effectively denied direct access to system resources, virtually all general purpose systems are to some degree dependent upon operating system integrity for the security of the data in the systems
Operating system integrity may be described as the ability of an operating system to resist any compromise of specified or implicit security controls that may occur through misuse or manipulation of defined or undefined software interfaces.
Historically, operating systems have been designed with the assumption that user programs will be written without intent to overreach implied limits of isolation. Operating system integrity does more than enhance data security. One important and very desirable effect is a significant reduction in system incidents. A high-integrity operating system is one in which all significant interfaces must be formalized and protected.
Such an operating system, well-insulated against damaging and destructive effects of erroneous code within itself and its application programs, will be more stable and thus will enable more predictable, trustworthy operation of the entire data processing resource. 
PERFORWNCE, STORAGE REQUIREMENTS AND HUMAN FACTORS
It is widely assumed that security features, functions and procedures are invariably costly to an installation in terms of performance degradation, storage requirements, human resentment and enforced awkwardness.
Experience shows that while some of this is true (and certainly it can be made to be true), it is largely fallacious.
Installations that have taken the trouble and spent the money to achieve high levels of security and to analyze the results of this activity have often found significant benefits that more than justify the security effort.
Among the positive side effects which installations have unexpectedly encountered are improved total performance of the system (higher reliability and availability because of its increased predictability) and of the entire installation (overall operation and threats to tne smooth continuity of that operation are better understood and can be better controlled). Once users and management recover from the shock of change and fully understand the improved protection and service achieved, human acceptance problems disappear rapidly.
Nevertheless, product designers have the responsibility of minimizing impacts in each of these areas.
Generally, good design practices should yield good performance, storage utilization and human factors. The following guidelines highlight significant objectives: 0 Performance degradation, if any, should be directly proportional to the extent to which management employs available security features and functions. Degradation should be expected with use of access control mechanisms, but only as a function of the degree to which the full capability of the mechanism is employed for a given operation. A reasonable objective should be not more than 5 percent degradation (job running, response time, and system-wide measurements) attributable to any use of an authorization mechanism, however complex. The intent of distributed processing is to make overall system operation more efficient in some way.
No security mechanism should lessen this efficiency by requiring that some function (e.g., authorization) be kept inboard or in the master control program when it could or should be placed partially in an outboard processor or internal software subsystem which controls a subset of system resources.
It is important that security mechanisms that are distributed throughout the entire system be as effective in enabling management to protect assets as though they were centralized. If a number of different processes throughout the system keep activity journals, those journals collectively should yield an accurate, usable record of the activities that management wants journalled, and should enable management to easily reconstruct the entire flow of events that was initiated by a given user, regardless of how that user was connected to the system. Where subsystems strive to be self-contained and self-supervisory, as do certain industryoriented subsystems, appropriate security mechanisms must be placed with each. Their design must be such that management can exercise control over user activities, derive activity records, and maintain personal accountability of users for their actions. i Often, processes are distributed to permit continued operations when a portion of the system, for any reason, is not functioning.
For example, a system may normally have the host down on weekends, or may lose communications with the host because of some disruption of the lines or the host operation.
In all cases, security capabilities under restricted operational conditions must be commensurate with the limited functions remaining. 10 .
TESTING PROCEDURES
Testing of security mechanisms can be difficult.
It is required not only that they do all that they are supposed to do, and do it correctly, but also that they do, or allow, nothing that they are not supposed to do.
Since testing a negative proposition is difficult, the specifications and design of the security mechanisms must be clear, complete, and if possible, all in one place so that conducting adequate reviews and constructing adequate tests of the mechanisms is simple and can be carried on throughout the development process.
If this is not the case, the probability of design oversights and flaws will be high.
11.

AUDITING
It is probably fair to say that in the course of the switch-over from manual systems to automated electronic systems in the past three decades many well established and well i understood auditing tools and practices have been neglected.
Hanual systems were developed ij over a very long time, were carefully studied by the auditing community, and many "classic" auditing safeguards were developed and widely used in those systems.
In the rush to automate, these safeguards were neglected in favor of increases in "useful function." Costs of application development have been high, and relatively little has been spent on adapting the manual auditing practices and techniques to the ADP environment.
The management and auditing communities have recognized over the past few years that enterprises are exposed to losses because ADP systems are insufficiently auditable. Today, ,i the situation is seen as sufficiently alarming that a great deal of resource is being applied I to try to rectify it. The lack of opportunity for independent, detailed examination of the computerized system is a principal problem of auditing today.
Most audits must be conducted around the computer, because they cannot go through it.
Insufficient information is captured and surfaced and controls needed to interpose testing do not exist.
Some examinations are achieved through informal modes of operation tolerated by the existing controls, but these modes are not recognized formally and could be eliminated in a tightening of controls.
Restoring the level of auditability that was available with manual systems, and supporting--even augmenting--it by formal ADP-oriented audit functions, are the principal goals of ADP i auditors today.
System, subsystem, and application designers must attempt to understand the needs of the auditors and include functions within their designs that will improve the auditability of installed systems.
The auditor is in a special position with regard to access to the system resources and control functions.
He is a potential security threat, because his work requires broad access capabilities.
Both the security functions and the auditing functions must be designed to ensure that the auditor's operations are properly controlled and that he can be held properly accountable for his activities. Among the dynamic examination auditing tools required, in addition to several data-retrieval and data-manipulation tools used in static examination, are those which support tag-trace operations, parallel operation, test monitoring, and input control.
Tag-trace is an auditing operation in which a tag, or special data field not accessible by the general user, indicates to the auditing process that the tagged record is to receive special processing.
The recognition of the tag, the special processing, and the journalling of the tagged item's activity together comprise tracing.
Parallel operation is the interleaved execution, upon test data, of real "production" code and of test code (designed to accomplish the same processing and outputs).
Interleaving may be at the machine instruction level or at some higher level (subroutines, etc.) if more convenient.
The intent is to determine the integrity of the production software, the accuracy of its operation, and any evidence of tampering.
Test monitor functions enable the auditor to generate input streams for processes, to record the execution of control paths (revealing unexpected code and untested paths), and to assess the validity of outputs resulting from known controlled inputs.
Input control operations seek to ensure that the system is properly accepting correct inputs, properly rejecting incorrect inputs, and properly accounting for and reprocessing the rejected inputs when they have been corrected. It 
